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I.  INTRODUCTION 
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 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from 
an order entered in the District Court on November 19, 2015, 
denying Hai Kim Nguyen’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 See Nguyen v. Hoffman, Civ. Act. No. 13-6845, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 156677 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2015).  Though the order 
denied Nguyen’s petition, it granted him a certificate of 
appealability on one of the grounds that he asserted in his 
petition—namely, that his trial counsel had been ineffective for 
failing to raise a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim.  We 
review the denial of his petition based on ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel grounds through a “doubly deferential” lens.  See 
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 
1420 (2009).  Thus, the question before us is whether Nguyen’s 
trial counsel’s representation met an objective standard of 
reasonableness or, if he did not meet that standard, his 
representation did not prejudice Nguyen.  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).  In light of 
the fact that Nguyen’s trial counsel did raise a Sixth Amendment 
speedy trial claim before trial on a motion to dismiss the 
indictment in the state trial court, we conclude that he cannot be 
deemed to have been ineffective for failing to raise the claim.  
Accordingly, without reaching the issue of prejudice, we will 
affirm the District Court’s denial of Nguyen’s petition.   
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. The State-Court Charges and Guilty Plea 
 On March 24, 2002, while attending a wedding reception 
in Green Brook Township, New Jersey, Nguyen shot another 
wedding guest, Tuan Thieu, eight times, fatally wounding him.  
At that time, Nguyen also shot at another wedding guest, but he 
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missed his target, and the bullet lodged in the wall of the 
wedding facility.  When the police arrived shortly after the 
shooting, several eye witnesses, each of whom knew Nguyen, 
identified him to the police as the shooter.  Witnesses also 
informed the police that Nguyen fled the scene in a 1996 Honda 
with Alabama license plates.  Moreover, witnesses provided the 
police with Nguyen’s address in Brooklyn. 
 On the day following the homicide, detectives from the 
Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office, accompanied by New 
York City Police Department officers, went to the Brooklyn 
address that the witnesses provided intending to arrest Nguyen.  
When the officers knocked on the door of the residence, Nguyen 
barricaded himself inside with his two-year-old son, and 
informed the officers that he would shoot his son and the 
officers if they attempted to enter.  After a four-hour standoff in 
which a New York Police Department hostage team 
participated, Nguyen agreed to be taken into custody, and the 
New York authorities arrested him on the evening of March 25, 
2002.1   
 While Nguyen was in custody in New York, a New York 
grand jury returned several indictments against him.  Nguyen 
pleaded guilty to the New York indictments on April 30, 2003, 
13 months after his arrest.  A New York court imposed 
concurrent sentences on Nguyen for these convictions, the 
longest of which was a five-to-fifteen year sentence on a bribery 
charge.   
                                                 
1 A subsequent police search uncovered physical evidence, 
including a gun found in a hidden compartment in Nguyen’s car. 
 Forensic testing confirmed the weapon to have been used in the 
wedding reception shootings. 
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 Prior to his guilty pleas to the New York indictments, at a 
time that he was still in custody in New York, a New Jersey 
grand jury in Somerset County returned an indictment on April 
24, 2002, relating to the March 24, 2002 shootings at the 
wedding reception.  That indictment charged Nguyen with first-
degree murder and other offenses as a result of his crimes at the 
wedding reception.  On May 13, 2003—shortly after he entered 
guilty pleas to the New York indictments—Nguyen waived 
extradition, and on November 7, 2003, he was extradited to New 
Jersey so that New Jersey authorities took custody of him.  After 
protracted pretrial proceedings, Nguyen pleaded guilty on 
September 23, 2009, to one count of aggravated manslaughter 
and one count of attempted murder.  He was sentenced on 
December 11, 2009, to a 20-year term of imprisonment to run 
concurrently with his New York sentence starting from the date 
of his New Jersey guilty pleas.  Nguyen’s habeas corpus 
petition, from the denial of which he appeals, turns on the events 
that occurred between his extradition in November 2003 and his 
entry of his guilty plea in September 2009.   
B. The Pretrial Proceedings 
 On September 2, 2004, Nguyen’s trial counsel in 
Somerset County filed an omnibus motion, which included 
motions to suppress physical evidence, to suppress statements, 
for a Sands-Brunson hearing,2 to preclude evidence of his other 
bad acts, and to conduct a hearing regarding the admissibility of 
statements made to non-police witnesses.  The trial court held a 
                                                 
2 A State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085 (N.J. 1993), and State v. 
Sands, 386 A.2d 378 (N.J. 1978), hearing would have involved 
evidence issues not material in this case. 
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hearing over two days in September 2005 to address the motion 
to suppress the homicide weapon and Nguyen’s statements made 
to non-police witnesses.  After the hearing, the parties filed 
briefs between October 2005 and February 2006.  The trial court 
heard oral argument on the motions to suppress on April 27, 
2006, and denied the motions.  The court subsequently denied 
the remainder of Nguyen’s pretrial motions in a written decision 
on February 11, 2009. 
 From August 2006 to June 2008, Nguyen pursued an 
insanity defense.  He filed his notice of insanity defense and 
lack of requisite state of mind as required by New Jersey court 
procedures on August 30, 2006.  The trial court entered a 
consent order on January 4, 2007, which provided for the release 
of medical records from the New York City Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene Correctional Health Services.  (A6). 
 On January 17, 2007, Nguyen’s counsel produced Nguyen’s 
medical and psychiatric record.  Subsequently, the State’s expert 
examined Nguyen in March 2007 and on October 5, 2007.  
Ultimately, the trial court held a competency hearing on 
December 13, 2007, at which both the State and defense counsel 
presented expert witnesses.  At that hearing, defense counsel 
stated that the defense expert would conduct a further 
examination of Nguyen in January 2008 and thereafter file an 
additional report.  It appears, however, that the expert did not 
make a further examination, and on June 26, 2008, the trial court 
determined that Nguyen was competent to proceed to trial.   
 Following this resolution of all outstanding motions, the 
court set a trial date for June 2009.  The State requested an 
adjournment and proposed a September 29, 2009 trial date, to 
which there was no objection.  Notably, the record reflects that 
while the case was pending in New Jersey, 12 conferences 
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scheduled in the case were adjourned, at least ten of them at the 
request of defense counsel. 
C. The Motion to Dismiss the Indictment 
 On July 1, 2009, defense counsel filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the Indictment for Violation of the Interstate Agreement 
on Detainers (“IAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:159A-1 et seq., a 
statute that sets forth a procedure for the transfer of prisoners 
between jurisdictions for trial in the receiving jurisdiction.  
Defense counsel filed a letter brief supporting the motion on 
September 21, 2009, seeking an order dismissing the indictment. 
 In making his IAD argument, defense counsel cited Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972), for the proposition 
that “‘a [d]efendant has no duty to bring himself to trial.  The 
State has that duty, as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is 
consistent with Due Process.’”  (A36 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. 
at 527, 92 S.Ct. at 2190)).  In his brief defense counsel included 
the following nine paragraphs in a footnote: 
The Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution 
guarantees an accused the right to a 
speedy trial.  An accused’s right to 
a speedy trial ripens after the filing 
of a formal criminal complaint.  
State v. LeVien, 44 N.J. 323 
(1965).  This fundamental right 
applies against the State through 
the Due Process [Clause] of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see 
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 
213 (1967), and the New Jersey 
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Constitution, Article I, Paragraph 
10 (1947).   
 In Barker v. Wingo, 407 
U.S. 514, 530 (1972), the United 
States Supreme Court established a 
balancing test to be used in 
determining whether a defendant’s 
right to a speedy trial has been 
violated.  The Court noted that the 
duty to bring a defendant to trial ‘as 
well as the duty of insuring that the 
trial is consistent with due process . 
. .’ rests entirely with the State.  Id. 
at 527.  See also State v. Smith, 70 
N.J. 214, 217 (1976) (applying the 
Barker v. Wingo balancing test). 
 The balancing test ‘compels 
Courts to approach speedy trial 
cases on an ad hoc basis.’  Barker 
v. Wingo, supra at 530.  It requires 
considering and weighing four 
factors: (1) the length of delay; (2) 
the reason for the delay; (3) the 
defendant’s assertion of his right; 
and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 
 Applying these factors to the 
case at hand, it is clear that Mr. 
Nguyen’s right to a speedy trial has 
been denied.  Mr. Nguyen was 
indicted in 2003 — six years ago.  
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Moreover, it has been six years 
since the Prosecutor’s Office filed 
to bring Mr. Nguyen to New Jersey 
under the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers.  This is clearly long 
enough to trigger a speedy trial 
analysis.  Barker v. Wingo, supra at 
530. 
 The second factor, the 
reason for the delay, must also be 
weighed against the State and not 
against Mr. Nguyen.  As the 
Supreme Court noted in Barker v. 
Wingo, ‘a [d]efendant has no duty 
to bring himself to trial.  The State 
has that duty, as well as the duty of 
insuring that the trial is consistent 
with Due Process.’  Id. at 527.  In 
this instance, the Prosecutor’s 
Office attempted in 2003 to bring 
Mr. Nguyen to New Jersey under 
the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers. 
 The third Barker v. Wingo 
factor addresses the defendant’s 
assertion of his right to a speedy 
trial.  As noted above, Mr. Nguyen 
waived extradition and has 
repeatedly requested a trial.  
Therefore he has no reason to seek 
to delay disposition of the New 
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Jersey charges. 
 The fourth and final factor 
to be considered is the prejudice 
resulting to Mr. Nguyen from this 
extraordinary delay.  ‘[I]mpairment 
of defense is considered the most 
serious factor since it . . . [goes] to 
the question of fundamental 
fairness,[’] State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 
196, 201 (1976).  Prejudice is not 
confined to the defendant’s 
inability or lessened ability to 
defend on the merits.  Prejudice can 
also be found from employment 
interruptions, public obloquy, 
anxieties concerning continued and 
unresolved prosecution, the drain 
on finances, and the like.  Moore v. 
Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973). 
 As noted above, any hope 
that Mr. Nguyen may have of 
serving any sentence on these 
charges concurrent to his New 
York sentence fades with the 
passage of time.  Moreover, Mr. 
Nguyen certainly has had the 
‘[a]nxiety and concern’ of this 
matter hanging over him for six 
long years.  Barker v. Wingo, supra 
at 532.  There is also actual 
prejudice to the defendant 
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considering the impact of such a 
lengthy delay on the memory of 
critical witnesses. 
 In sum, since all four factors 
set out in Barker v. Wingo must be 
weighed against the State, Mr. 
Nguyen’s right to a speedy trial has 
clearly been violated. 
(A36-37 n.1).   
 The trial court heard oral argument on Nguyen’s motion 
on September 23, 2009, and issued an oral decision rejecting the 
motion to dismiss the indictment.  The court then entered an 
order to that effect.   
 Following this oral decision and a short recess to discuss 
his options with trial counsel, Nguyen pleaded guilty to one 
count of aggravated manslaughter and one count of attempted 
murder.  Nguyen’s plea preserved both the right to appeal from 
the denial of his Motion to Dismiss the Indictment by reason of 
a violation of the IAD and the right to appeal from the 
disposition of all pretrial motions.  On December 11, 2009, the 
trial court imposed a 20-year sentence on Nguyen to run 
concurrently from the date of the entry of his guilty plea with the 
New York sentence that he already was serving. 
D. The Direct Appeal and Subsequent Motion for 
Post-Conviction Relief 
 Nguyen appealed from his conviction based on his guilty 
plea on several grounds.  Relevant for our purposes, he argued 
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“that the trial court should have dismissed the indictment 
because the State did not bring him to trial within 120 days after 
his arrival in New Jersey, as required by the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers . . . .”  State v. Nguyen, 17 A.3d 256, 
258 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).3  The Appellate Division 
of the Superior Court rejected this argument because it found 
that “New York transferred custody of defendant under the 
Extradition Clause of the United States Constitution and the 
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act”—not the IAD, a 
determination that Nguyen does not challenge in these 
proceedings.  Id.  The Appellate Division reasoned that “the 
transfer of a defendant from one jurisdiction to another under 
legal authority other than the IAD . . . provides an alternative 
framework by which a state may secure custody of a prisoner 
confined in another state without being required to comply with 
the procedures of the IAD.”  Id. at 263.  Thus, the State was not 
bound by the requirements of the IAD, and therefore there could 
not have been an IAD violation.  Id.  Notably, the court stated in 
a footnote that a defendant who is transferred pursuant to legal 
authority other than the IAD—while not entitled to the 120-day 
speedy trial provision of the IAD—“may, of course, invoke the 
                                                 
3 Nguyen also argued “that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress evidence of a handgun later identified as the 
murder weapon, because it was discovered in the course of a 
search by Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office investigators 
who were not authorized under the governing New York statute 
to conduct a search in New York,” Nguyen, 17 A.3d at 258, and 
that he “was entitled to jail credits for the entire time he was 
incarcerated in New Jersey awaiting trial,” id. at 266.  The 
Appellate Division rejected both of these arguments.  Id. at 258, 
266. 
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speedy trial protections of the federal and state constitutions.”  
Id. at 260 n.1.  However, the Appellate Division indicated that 
Nguyen “ha[d] not asserted a violation of his constitutional right 
to a speedy trial.”  Id.  Nguyen filed a petition for certification 
with the New Jersey Supreme Court but it denied his petition.  
State v. Nguyen, 27 A.3d 952 (N.J. 2011).   
 He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) 
in a state trial court.  (See A117-22).  In that petition, Nguyen 
contended that there were three errors that entitled him to relief: 
(1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to raise a 
Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation; (2) ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel for failing to challenge the trial 
court’s ruling on the admissibility of his post-arrest statements; 
and (3) a violation of due process as a result of the denial of his 
request for jail credits.  The PCR court heard oral argument on 
May 29, 2012, and on May 30, 2012, it issued a comprehensive 
written opinion denying Nguyen’s petition. 
 In considering the issue now before us, the PCR court 
concluded that trial counsel “did not fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness” and, in fact, “pursue[d] a speedy 
trial claim on the eve of trial.”  (A156).  Moreover, the PCR 
court concluded that even if Nguyen’s showing satisfied the first 
prong of the Strickland test, i.e., counsel’s deficient 
performance, Nguyen nevertheless would not be entitled to 
relief on the basis of that claim because he did not demonstrate 
that he suffered prejudice from his counsel’s representation.  
Specifically, the PCR court held that “the Petitioner was the 
cause of the delay as he filed numerous valid pretrial motions in 
furtherance of exercising his constitutional rights.”  (A158).  
Moreover, the PCR court determined that “[e]ach motion was 
complex in nature and both counsel and the court properly spent 
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the requisite amount of time in order to fully weigh and resolve 
the Petitioner’s contentions.”  (A158).  Thus, any delay “cannot 
be claimed to be a result of the failure of the State to act.”  
(A158).   
 Nguyen then appealed from the order denying his petition 
for PCR to the Appellate Division, which affirmed 
“substantially for the reasons stated by the PCR court in its 
thorough and comprehensive opinion of May 30, 2012.”  State 
v. Nguyen, No. A-5303-11, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 
331, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 13, 2013).  The court 
added “that when the trial court addressed the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss the indictment for failing to resolve the 
charges in the time required by the IAD,” it also “found that the 
delay in the matter did not violate defendant’s constitutional 
right to a speedy trial.”  Id. at *7.  In addition, the Appellate 
Division agreed that “even if counsel erred in failing to raise this 
specific claim, defendant was not prejudiced by the error 
because any such motion would have been denied.”  Id. at *8.  
On September 10, 2013, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied 
Nguyen’s petition for certification seeking further review of his 
case.  See State v. Nguyen, 73 A.3d 512 (N.J. 2013).   
E. The Habeas Petition 
 Following the exhaustion of his state-court remedies, 
Nguyen filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District 
Court.  Nguyen’s petition advanced the same three claims for 
relief that he had made in his PCR petition—namely: (1) his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to assert a Sixth Amendment 
speedy trial argument; (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective 
for failing to raise a Miranda suppression issue; and (3) the state 
court’s denial of jail credits deprived him of due process.  See 
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Nguyen, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156677, at *11.   
 The District Court rejected all of Nguyen’s arguments but 
was troubled by the speedy trial issue.  Specifically, it had 
concerns about whether trial counsel had, in fact, advanced a 
Sixth Amendment argument.  However, it determined that the 
state courts had made a factual finding that trial counsel raised 
the argument—a finding the District Court deemed reasonable 
in light of the trial court transcripts—and that it had to defer to 
that finding.  Id. at *26.  As a result, it concluded that Nguyen 
could not clear Strickland’s first prong, which requires a 
showing of deficient performance.  Id.  Nevertheless, the Court 
addressed the prejudice prong of Strickland in its opinion 
because it determined that many of the delays in the prosecution 
of the case were not attributable to Nguyen, and thus there may 
have been merit to his constitutional speedy trial claim.  The 
Court concluded that “if this claim had been raised here as an 
independent sixth amendment speedy trial claim”—as opposed 
to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim—“the Court could 
very well find that a constitutional violation had occurred.”  Id. 
at *44-45.  But because the Court determined that the state PCR 
court’s determination on the first Strickland prong was “a 
reasonable application of clearly established federal law, based 
on a reasonable determination of the facts,” it could not 
conclude that Nguyen met the two-prong test for demonstrating 
that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 
*45.  Accordingly, it entered an order on November 19, 2015, 
denying the petition for habeas corpus.  The Court nevertheless 
issued a certificate of appealability with respect to the alleged 
speedy trial violation.4 
                                                 
4 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), an appeal may not be taken 
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III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 2254, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  We review the District Court’s denial 
of the petition for habeas corpus de novo, as the District Court 
did not hold an evidentiary hearing.  See Thomas v. Horn, 570 
F.3d 105, 113 (3d Cir. 2009).  Moreover, the state court’s 
factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness, and 
the petitioner bears the burden to rebut that presumption by clear 
and convincing evidence.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also 
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 441, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2620 
(1986).   
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 A district court has authority to issue a writ of habeas 
                                                                                                             
from a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 
appealability.  A justice or judge may issue a certificate of 
appealability “only if the applicant has made a substantial 
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”  28 U.S.C. § 
2253(c)(2).  “A petitioner satisfies this standard by 
demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the 
district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that 
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to 
deserve encouragement to proceed further.”  Miller-El v. 
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1034 (2003).  
Here, the District Court determined that reasonable jurists could 
disagree with its conclusion.  Nguyen, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
156677, at *46-47. 
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corpus to an individual in state custody solely on the ground that 
he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”), which deals with petitions for habeas corpus, 
provides: 
An application for a writ of habeas 
corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of 
a State court shall not be granted 
with respect to any claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits in State 
court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim -- 
(1)  resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States; or 
(2)  resulted in a decision that was 
based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light 
of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding. 
Id. § 2254(d).   
 Accordingly, the “AEDPA prohibits federal habeas relief 
for any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless one 
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of the exceptions listed in § 2254(d) obtains.”  Premo v. Moore, 
562 U.S. 115, 121, 131 S.Ct. 733, 739 (2011).  The AEDPA in 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) “‘permit[s] relitigation where the earlier 
state decision resulted from “an unreasonable application of” 
clearly established federal law.’”  Id. (quoting Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011)).  The 
Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he applicable federal law 
consists of the rules for determining when a criminal defendant 
has received inadequate representation as defined in Strickland.” 
 Id.  
In accordance with the foregoing rules, Nguyen can 
demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel only if he first 
demonstrates that his counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.  Nguyen also must demonstrate that his 
trial counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial, such that 
there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.”  Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.  A “reasonable 
probability” means a probability “sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  Id.  Importantly, the Supreme 
Court has made clear that “there is no reason for a court 
deciding an ineffective assistance claim to . . . address both 
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient 
showing on one” of the requisite prongs.  Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 
2069.  Thus, unless there is a finding that counsel acted 
unreasonably, there is no need to consider whether there was 
prejudice that can be attributed to his representation.  Id.   
 With respect to the first Strickland prong, it is well 
established that “‘the Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants only a fair trial and a competent attorney.  It does not 
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insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every 
conceivable constitutional claim.’”  United States v. Travillion, 
759 F.3d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 
U.S. 107, 134, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1575 (1982)).  On appeal, we 
“must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Id. 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  In short, 
Strickland directs that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s 
performance must be highly deferential” and “every effort 
[must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, 
to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective 
at the time.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. 
It is equally well established that “habeas corpus is not to 
be used as a second criminal trial, and federal courts are not to 
run roughshod over the considered findings and judgments of 
the state courts that conducted the original trial and heard the 
initial appeals.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 383, 120 
S.Ct. 1495, 1508 (2000).  Rather, the Supreme Court has “long 
insisted that federal habeas courts attend closely to those 
considered decisions, and give them full effect when their 
findings and judgments are consistent with federal law.”  Id.   
 
The interplay between the highly deferential standard of 
habeas review and that of a Strickland analysis is critical.  As 
the Supreme Court has reiterated, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s 
high bar is never an easy task.”  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 
356, 371, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).  Because an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim can “function as a way to escape 
rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at 
trial [or in pretrial proceedings],” courts must apply the 
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Strickland standard “with scrupulous care, lest ‘intrusive post-
trial inquiry’ threaten the integrity of the very adversary process 
the right to counsel is meant to serve.”  Premo, 562 U.S. at 122, 
131 S.Ct. at 739-40 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 
S.Ct. at 2066).  “Establishing that a state court’s application of 
Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more 
difficult.”  Id. at 122, 131 S.Ct. at 740 (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court explained: 
 
The Strickland standard is a general 
one, so the range of reasonable 
applications is substantial.  Federal 
habeas courts must guard against 
the danger of equating 
unreasonableness under Strickland 
with unreasonableness under § 
2254(d).  When § 2254(d) applies, 
the question is not whether 
counsel’s actions were reasonable.  
The question is whether there is any 
reasonable argument that counsel 
satisfied Strickland’s deferential 
standard.  
Id. at 122-23, 131 S.Ct. at 740 (internal citation omitted).  In 
sum, “[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are 
both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, 
review is doubly so.”  Id. at 122, 131 S.Ct. at 740 (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 
Nguyen filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on 
several grounds, but, on appeal, we address only his claim that 
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trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial argument, as he obtained a certificate 
of appealability only on that issue.  But, of course, if counsel did 
assert a speedy trial violation, he cannot be deemed ineffective 
for failing to have done so.  After our review of the record, we 
find that he did seek dismissal of the indictment on speedy trial 
grounds, and thus Nguyen premises his argument on a flawed 
reading of the record.   
 
As set forth in full above, trial counsel’s September 21, 
2009 brief supporting his motion to dismiss the indictment 
included a nine-paragraph footnote that set forth and argued the 
Barker v. Wingo factors.  Trial counsel stated that “[t]he Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an 
accused the right to a speedy trial,” and that “Mr. Nguyen’s right 
to a speedy trial has clearly been violated.”  (A36-37 n.1).  
Nguyen challenges the import of this footnote as demonstrating 
that his counsel raised the speedy trial issue in the trial court on 
two grounds, neither of which we deem meritorious. 
 
Nguyen claims that the District Court, and this Court, on 
habeas corpus review, must give deference to the factual 
findings of the Appellate Division on appeal from the denial of 
PCR.  Specifically, Nguyen contends that we must defer to the 
following statement from the Appellate Division’s decision:  “In 
any event, the PCR court correctly found that defendant was not 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney 
did not seek dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the 
delay in resolving the charges violated his constitutional right to 
a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”  Nguyen, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 331, at 
*7.  Nguyen reads this sentence as a determination that 
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counsel did not raise a Sixth Amendment argument. Though the 
“because” clause in the quoted sentence is somewhat 
ambiguous, the context shows that the Appellate Division was 
not taking a position on the issue. The sentence that precedes it 
gives a reason why counsel perhaps should be deemed to have 
raised the argument—namely, that the trial court, in ruling on 
the IAD motion, “also found that the delay in the matter did not 
violate defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Id.  
And the sentence that comes after approves the conclusion that, 
“even if” counsel did not raise the claim, Nguyen “was not 
prejudiced by the error because any such motion would have 
been denied.” Id. at *8. The Appellate Division then goes on to 
explain why, in its view, the Sixth Amendment claim lacked 
merit. Thus, the better reading of the record is that the District 
Court took no position on the first prong of Strickland and 
resolved the case entirely on the absence of prejudice.5  
                                                 
5 Nguyen also argues that, regardless of what the Appellate 
Division said on PCR review, it determined on direct appeal 
from his convictions that trial counsel failed to raise a Sixth 
Amendment argument.  He bases that contention on the Court’s 
statement on direct review that Nguyen “has not asserted a 
violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.”  Nguyen, 
17 A.3d at 260 n.1.  However, we do not read this statement to 
say that Nguyen never asserted such an argument at any level, 
either trial or appellate.  Rather, we understand it to state the 
undisputed fact that, regardless of what happened at the trial 
level, Nguyen did not raise a Sixth Amendment argument on 
direct appeal.  Indeed, appellate courts frequently describe 
issues as not being raised in reference to them not being argued 
on appeal without implying that they were never presented at 
any time.  
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In any event, this is not a case that turns on the 
applicability of the presumption that state-court findings are 
correct, as the record from the trial level is clear. Specifically, it 
is undisputed that counsel included a nine-paragraph footnote in 
the brief supporting the motion to dismiss that unequivocally 
raised the issue of whether Nguyen’s constitutional right to a 
speedy trial had been denied.  Thus, the record conclusively 
rebuts any statement that counsel did not make a speedy trial 
argument in the state trial court. 
 
Nguyen alternatively contends that trial counsel did not 
raise a speedy trial argument adequately before the trial court 
because he advanced the argument only in a footnote.  
(Appellant’s Br. at 32 (citing Ethypharm S.A. Fr. v. Abbott 
Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 231 n.13 (3d Cir. 2013))).6  Thus, Nguyen 
claims that, because his counsel did not place the nine-paragraph 
argument in the main text of the brief, we cannot conclude that 
he raised the speedy trial argument in the trial court.  But the 
cases on which Nguyen relies for this conclusory proposition all 
deal with a fundamentally different question—namely, whether 
by inclusion in a footnote in an appellate brief an argument was 
properly raised on appeal.  See Ethypharm, 707 F.3d at 231 
                                                 
6 In Ethypharm we quoted Laborer’s Int’l Union of N. Am., 
AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 
1994), for the point that “a passing reference to an issue . . . will 
not suffice to bring that issue before [a] court.”  Ethypharm, 707 
F.3d at 231 n.13 (internal quotation marks omitted).  It seems 
clear that Ethypharm can hardly help Nguyen because the nine-
paragraph footnote surely cannot be regarded as having been 
inserted in his brief to the trial court in passing. 
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n.13; SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 
1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006);7 John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. 
CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997); 
State v. Coley, Nos. A-2170-11, A-2171-11, 2014 N.J. Super. 
Unpub. LEXIS 1384, at *7 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 
12, 2014); Coast Auto. Grp., Ltd. v. Withum Smith & Brown, 
995 A.2d 300, 306 n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010); 
Muhammad v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 877 A.2d 340, 
347 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005), rev’d on other 
grounds, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006).  But none of these cases 
addresses the question of whether a trial counsel fails to advance 
an argument adequately by advancing it only in a footnote in a 
brief.  In any event, in view of the highly comprehensive 
exposition of the speedy trial issue in the footnote that we have 
quoted in full, we simply cannot conclude that Nguyen’s 
attorney did not raise the issue in the trial court.   
 
We also point out that we are quite familiar with 
procedures followed in New Jersey state courts and we have no 
doubt that those courts, which favor reaching the merits of a 
case, would regard the footnote that we have quoted as having 
adequately raised a constitutional speedy trial issue.  In this 
regard, we note that the question of whether an issue was raised 
properly in a state court must be viewed from the perspective of 
that court, even if a federal court would not consider the 
                                                 
7 In SmithKline Beecham, 419 F.3d at 1320 n.9, the court said it 
had “discretion to consider arguments that are not properly 
raised in the opening brief.”  Surely the New Jersey trial court at 
least had discretion to consider the speedy trial footnote, and so 
do we.  If we felt a need to exercise discretion on the footnote 
issue in order to consider it, we would do so.   
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argument properly raised because it used a more demanding 
standard for preserving an issue than the state court. 
 
Because we conclude that trial counsel did, in fact, raise 
the argument of petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy trial 
in the trial court, he cannot be deemed to have been ineffective 
for failing to do so.  Consequently, Nguyen is not entitled to the 
grant of a writ of habeas corpus.   
 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order of November 19, 2015, denying Nguyen’s petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
 Hai Kim Nguyen v. Attorney General et al. 
No.  15-3902 
_________________________________________________ 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring 
I join fully Judge Greenberg’s excellent opinion but 
write separately to emphasize the importance of the trial 
judge’s rejection of Nguyen’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial 
defense. As Judge Greenberg notes, Nguyen’s counsel 
included in a brief an extensive footnote that argued each of 
the factors in the Supreme Court’s seminal speedy trial case, 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Equally crucial, 
though, is the judge’s reaction to the briefing. Specifically, he 
concluded during oral arguments that the delay did not “run 
afoul of . . . the standards set forth in Barker versus Wingo.” 
In my view, this both reinforces the conclusion that Nguyen 
cannot clear the first hurdle of Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984), and shows why he also fails the second one.  
As Judge Greenberg explains, Nguyen’s first 
obligation under Strickland is to show that his counsel’s 
performance was constitutionally deficient. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687. He argues that he can satisfy this requirement 
because counsel included the Sixth Amendment defense in a 
footnote rather than the main body of the brief. My colleagues 
correctly reject this argument under the highly deferential 
lens that we must apply when looking at Strickland claims 
governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 
U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (noting that both Strickland and 
AEDPA require deference and that when a claim is subject to 
both the review is “doubly deferential”). This deference 
makes it difficult to conclude, in the absence of contrary 
state-court case law, that a New Jersey trial judge could not 
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have considered a nine-paragraph footnote that fully argued 
the relevant factors.  
 If there were any doubt about this determination, the 
judge’s rejection of the Sixth Amendment defense eliminates 
it. This is not a case where there is merely no reason to think 
the judge was barred from reaching the argument. Rather, we 
know that he did decide it. This suggests that, contrary to 
Nguyen’s assertions, the argument was properly before the 
judge. The combination of these two factors—the lack of case 
law preventing the judge from reaching the issue and the 
evidence that he actually decided it—is fatal under our 
deferential review. 
  The judge’s rejection of the argument also shows 
why, even if Nguyen’s counsel had been deficient, there was 
no prejudice. Prejudice requires that it be “reasonably likely 
the result would have been different” if counsel had been 
effective. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111 (2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). In our case, there is no 
need to guess what the outcome would have been if counsel 
had included the speedy trial argument in the main body of 
the brief rather than the footnote. That is because we know, 
based on the judge’s comments during arguments, that he did 
not think the delay violated the Sixth Amendment.  
 Under other circumstances, Nguyen perhaps could 
have shown prejudice by establishing a reasonable likelihood 
that an appeal would have resulted in a reversal of the judge’s 
decision. See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 
64 (3d Cir. 1989). Here, however, Nguyen pled guilty after 
the judge rejected the Sixth Amendment argument. He 
reserved in his plea the ability to argue on appeal that the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2A:159A-1 et seq., barred his prosecution, but he did not 
leave open the option to present the appellate court with a 
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Sixth Amendment speedy trial defense.1 We have held that a 
guilty plea that does not reserve the right to make a speedy 
trial argument waives that issue for appellate purposes. 
Washington v. Sobina, 475 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Nguyen was therefore not entitled to (nor did he) ask the 
appellate court to review the Sixth Amendment issue. Id. 
 The District Court overlooked our decision in 
Washington and concluded that Nguyen’s guilty plea did not 
waive the defense. Nguyen v. Hoffman, Civ. Action No. 13-
6845, 2015 WL 7306425, at *10 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2015). In 
light of our binding precedent to the contrary, this was 
incorrect. Because Nguyen cannot show that the outcome 
might have been different at the trial level or that he could 
have secured a reversal on appeal, he cannot demonstrate 
prejudice. As a result, even if he could meet Strickland’s first 
requirement, the District Court’s judgment should still be 
affirmed.  
                                              
1 Nguyen did reserve, in addition to the ability to contest the 
trial judge’s resolution of the IAD issue, the right to appeal 
“all his pretrial motions.” However, he has conceded that this 
did not include the right to present a Sixth Amendment 
argument. See Opening Br. at 12 & n.4; Reply Br. at 5–6. 
 
